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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF l'"T~-\H. by and through
its ROAD CO~I:JllS~ION, D. H.
\Yhittenburg, Chairman, and Layton ~Iaxfield and H. J. Corleissen,
members of the ST~-\TE ROAD
CO:JI:JIISSIOX,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
H Y R U ~I ~-\. DANIELSON and
OLIYL-\ B. DAXIELSON, his
wife: and C. ELLS"\VORTH HANSEX and FLOR.ENCE HANSEN,
his wife,
DefeHd ants and Respondents.

Civil No. 7752

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATE~fENT

OF FACTS

We are substantially content with appellant's statement of the facts. VV e desire to stress, however, the fact
that prior to the condemnation proceedings the Hansen
property was immediately adjacent to the northeast to a
right angle turn on Highland Drive and 6200 South in
Salt Lake County, and that the Danielson property wa~
to the south and west immediately across 6200 South
Street. By the condemnation proceedings, the State has
voided the right angle turn, taking "thru traffic" north
and south on Highland Drive and thus a portion of the
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Hansen property and the Danielson property (see map
following R. 5). Obviously, traffic formerly going to Big
Cottonwood Canyon has been diverted to the south so
that it will by-pass many fine homes in the vicinity.
The fact remains, in the absence of any proof to
the contrary and which the State seems to recognize,
that by shunting the right angle turn property having
potential business use has lost a frontage value. The
State is irked at not having the values submitted by its
engineers sustained.
The State elected to file the action against the
respondents jointly and then concedes in its statement
of facts that, although a motion to proceed separately
against the defendants was never formally ruled upon,
it was prejudiced by the consolidation of the issues for
trial.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
We will disGuss the statement of points in the reverse order as those stated by appellant, eliminating
appellant's last point for the reason that it is included
in our Point I. We present the case in the following
manner:
POINT I.
THE JUDGMENT AS TO VALUE IS SUSTAINED BY
THE EVIDENCE.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING INTEREST
AT THE JUDGMENT RATE FROM THE DATE OF THE
ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY.
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POINT III.·
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSOLIDATING THE
CASES FOR PURPOSES OF TRIAL.

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I.
THE JUDG::\IENT AS TO VALUE IS SUSTAINED BY
THE EVIDENCE.

The trial court, in its memorandum decision, found
the damages sustained by defendants Hansen as follows:
Loss of use----------------------------$2665.00
Land taken -------------------------- 1120.00
Cost of filL____________________________ 390.00
$4175.00
Credited back for
limited use ------------------------

666.00

Net Loss ------~--------------$3509.00

plus costs and
interest from
day of taking

and then further found that the damages sustained by
defendants Danielson were as follows:
Corner for business ____________ $1990.00
Land taken -------------------------- 64 7.00
Cost of filL____________________________ 580.90
Cost of Piping______________________ 194.00
Net Loss ----------------------$3411.90

plus costs and
interest from
day of taking,

as will be determined from the trial court's memorandum
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decision (R. 298-299). The testimony of the various witnesses, including C. Francis Solomon, an expert in his
field, were analyzed and the testimony, as it appears
from the record, of Mrs. Danielson as to the damage to
her fruit trees was excluded. There is competent, relevant and material evidence to support the judgment of
the trial court.
The bias and prejudice that appellant claims is not
supported by the record and can only be attributed to
its chagrin in having waived a jury trial and letting a
competent court determine the issues.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING INTEREST
AT THE JUDGMENT RATE FROM THE DATE OF THE
ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY.

An old text, Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition,
is applicable to these proceedings. Section 831 is to the
effect that proceedings in the exercise of eminent domain
are statutory in character and that final adjudication
in such proceedings is conclusive as to all intendments
of the same. Section 832 of the same text is to the effect
that an order of immediate occupancy is res judicata
as to the public character of the use, as well as the
necessity for condemnation and the amount of land
required, leaving for future determination the damage
incidental thereto.
See also Justice Larson's concurring and dissenting
opinion in Hyde Park Town v. Chambers et al., 99 Utah
118, 104 p. 2d 220.
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There i~ no dispute but what interest should start
from the date of the order of immediate occupancy.
Salt Lake LlJ U. R. Co. v. Scl1 ram m et al., 56 Utah 53,
lS~) P. 90, wherein the court stated:
.. The action was c01nmenced by filing of complaint in the district court February 21, 1918.
Order was 1nade granting right of immediate pos~ession of premises pending condemnation proceedings ~~pril :28, 1918. Trial was concluded,
verdict rendered, and judgment entered January
30, 1919. Under authority of Oregon S. L. R. Co.
v. Jones, :29 r tah, 1-17, 80 Pac. 732, in which the
question of interest upon the amount of damages
assessed for the taking of the property in this
class of cases was ably and exhaustively discussed
hy :Jir. Justice Straup, and in which it was held
that in our jurisdiction interest should not be
computed from date of commencement of the
action, but rather from the date of the order of
occupancy, which in this case would be April 29,
1918, this assignment of error is well founded.
The above case is controlling, and should have
been followed; therefore the trial court erred in
allowing interest from the date of the commenceInent of the action."
This leaves the sole question as to whether the interest should be six per cent or eight per cent. Section
44-0-1, U.C.A. 1943, provides that the legal rate of inter-

est for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or
things in action shall be six per cent per annum, while

Section 44-0-4 provides as follows:
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"Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract
shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest
agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall bear
interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum."
The order of immediate occupancy was a final judgment as to the taking of property and, therefore, such
judgment should be entitled to interest at the rate of
eight per cent rather than six per cent. The damage
occurred at that time and the compensation became
owing to the parties. It was just a matter of fixing the
amount to be paid that remained for the court to determine.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSOLIDATING THE
CASES FOR PURPOSES OF TRIAL.

As pointed out in our statement of the facts, there
is no substantial difference between actual land values
in the property involved and then you add to this the
fact that .the State elected to join the Hansens and the
Danielsons in the same action. There is no showing
in the record nor in the brief that the State was prejudiced by trying the two land questions in the one
action. The question is not worthy of consideration.
CONCLUSION
1. The procedure followed by the trial judge did
not result in any substantial inconvenience or damage
to the State.
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2. The State elected to bring this action, joining
the respondents a~ parties defendant, and, therefore,.
should not now be heard to complain that the actions
were not separably n1aintained or stated.
3. Condemnation proceedings involving separate
parcels of real property in the same locality should be
tried as one issue, leaving to the trier of the fact matters of special damage or in the way of improvements
as affects the respective parcels.
4. The interim feature of interest is not involved
in this case because of the order of immediate occupancy.
5. The minute the State filed its action there were
two problems to resolve: ( 1) The right to take the property, which was resolved by the order of immediate occupancy. (:2) The citizen's right to a future determination
of damage.
6. The order of immediate occupancy was in every
respect and had every significance of a judgment, leaving for future determination the question of damage.
7. Section 44-0-1, UCA. 1943, provides the legal
rate of interest at six per cent per annum, but counsel
does not point to Section 44-0-4, which reads as follows:
"Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract
shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest
agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall bear
interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum."
8.

The effect of the order of immediate occupancy
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was to take one's property. It is our contention that
the order had the same effect of a final judgment, at
least in that regard, and, therefore, the interest rate
pertaining to judgments should be enforced against the
State from that date, the damage or compensation to
the citizen being only incidental.
9. C. Francis Solomon, a competent witness, testified in favor of the defendants and controverted the
State's likewise expert testimony as to values. Complaint is made about Solomon's testimony and yet he was
not challenged as to his cmnpetency in the appraisal
of real estate. The property involved in this litigation
was in a commercial zone and had frontage on 6200
South Street. The record shows that some lands had
been sold for as much as $4,000.00 an acre. Solomon's
testimony indicates that he took into consideration the
front-foot commercial value of the property taken by the
State, consistent with a much more modest acreage
value that he placed upon the land.
10. The trial court apparently excluded the value
of the apple trees and the reference to the apple trees
in counsel's brief is beside the point and is an attempt
to convince this court that the judgment appealed from
is based upon something not in the record.
11. This court has announced by authorities too
numerous to mention that it will not set aside a judgment
or a verdict supported by any competent, relevant or
1naterial evidence so far as the amount is concerned.
The State stipulated that the case be tried without a
jury. Therefore, the trial court became the trier of the
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facts. 'Yith the c01nbined testimony of ~Irs. Danielson,
:Jir. Hansen, C. Francis Sol01non and other witnesses
who testified as to values, it cannot be said that there
was not substantial evidence in that regard and, therefore, the feature of this appeal having to do with values
should be sununarily dismissed.
12. On page 15 of counsel's brief the implication
is that some one in the vicinity of the property "secured
an extra good deal." How can any citizen secure a good
deal when the sovereign takes over property and leaves
it to him or to her to prove the value of the same~ Furthermore, this case has to do with the differential of six
per cent and eight per cent interest from the time of
immediate occupancy.
'Ve suggest that in this case there be a per curian1
order forthwith, announcing that the State pays its honest obligation upon a decision fairly made by the trial
court.
Respectfully submitted,
HARLEY W. GUSTIN
Attorney for Respondents
Hyrum A. Danielson and
Olivia B. Danielson
ELLIOTT W. EVANS
Attorney for Respondents
C. Ellsworth Hansen and
Florence Hansen
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